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INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND THE
(HOPED-FOR) EFFECTS OF CANDOR AND
INTEGRITY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
PAUL HORWITZ*
My contribution to this discussion of the ethics of legal scholarship begins
with a confession that complicates my treatment of these questions. It is a
lengthy confession and may appear to be a digression. But it seems to me both
a necessary context for the rather simple recommendations I ultimately make
here, and a potentially useful contribution to this conversation in itself.
I am an institutional pluralist, both between and within institutions.1
Different institutions—churches, “the press,” religious institutions, and others,
including universities—have different functions, norms, and traditions. They
fill different roles in the architecture of civil society. They draw on different
purposes; make use of different forms of expertise and training; and add in
different ways to public discourse and social structure. Each contributes to a
healthy, vibrant civil society. They may even aid in working toward whatever
it is that we call “justice.” But they do so in different ways. Each institution
contributes best by serving its own particular calling, not by trying to do
everything. Universities do not exist to save souls; the information the press
provides, and the means it uses to obtain it, are quite different from the kind of
information provided by the academy and the means used to seek knowledge
within that institution.
These institutions and their practices are not fixed. They change and adapt
in response to both internal and external developments, including changes in
both other institutions and the larger society. Members of these institutions
hold internal debates about their norms and practices and their proper function.
Some of their roles, norms, and practices may change dramatically over time,
albeit in a way that is influenced by their particular histories and traditions.
Other aspects of these institutions may be treated as part of the unchanging core
of what it means to be a particular institution.
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I thank the editors of the Marquette
Law Review for their hard work and patience and for their efforts in putting on this Symposium. I am
especially grateful to Chad Oldfather and Carissa Byrne Hessick, the prime movers behind this
Symposium.
1. See generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013).
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Two related conditions ought to be true of this process of change. First,
these changes should belong primarily to the institutions themselves, drawing
on their own norms, practices, traditions, and current debates.2 Of course the
press (for example) is not immune from market forces, social changes, the
effects of technological change, and so on.3 But changes in institutional
practices and functions should come primarily as a result of considered internal
debate, not dictation from external authorities.
Second, these institutions need not—almost certainly should not—serve as
exact replicas of general social institutions and liberal democratic norms. They
should resist the “logic of congruence,” the insistence that “the internal life and
organization of associations [should] mirror liberal democratic principles and
practices.”4 Every citizen has an equal right to speak in a liberal democratic
society, and both the liberty and equality inherent in this right rest in part on the

2. See Gail J. Hupper, Educational Ambivalence: The Rise of a Foreign-Student Doctorate in
Law, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 319 (2015) (citing Yale Law School Introduces Innovative New
Program—Ph.D. in Law, YALE L. SCH. (July 11, 2012), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/yale-lawschool-introduces-innovative-new-program-phd-law [https://perma.cc/SRB5-EZPS]. This suggests
that institutions and their members ought to have some sense of their own history and traditions. This
is not always true, to say the least. Institutions and their members, like the rest of society, seem to
display an increasing ignorance of, or indifference toward, their own history, a lack of sound training
and inculcation in their particular practices, and either ignorance of, or a positive contempt for,
institutional tradition. This is certainly true in legal education. Some of that has to do with general
developments that apply to various institutions. Some of it is specific to legal education. Law schools
(Yale notwithstanding) train lawyers, not law professors, and are often focused on practical learning
rather than conscious inculcation of their students in a tradition as such. And, at least until recently,
there was no guarantee that potential law professors would be steeped in any kind of legal academic
tradition or canon. Law professors went from law school to clerkship to a smidgeon of practice to
teaching, with perhaps an LL.M. in a particular subject. They were not required to read the legal and
legal scholarly canon, to the extent that one exists, in its entirety, as graduate students in other fields
in the humanities and social sciences generally do. It is true that more law professors today emerge
from fellowships and graduate programs, at least some of which promise to “give students a broad
foundation in the canon of legal scholarship.” Id. For a general description of Yale’s doctorate in law,
see Ph.D. Program, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/degree-programs/graduateprograms/phd-program [https://perma.cc/W2TB-P5JY] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). But doctoral
programs in law, even if they actually deliver on such promises, are rare, and fellowships vary greatly
in nature. I have not found much evidence that fledgling law professors emerging from fellowship
programs are much steeped in a legal scholarly canon or legal tradition qua American law professors,
aside (perhaps) from having read some of the key texts in their own specialized area of work. It is
difficult to respect a tradition of which one is only vaguely aware.
3. See generally, e.g., FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF
BIG TECH (2017) (discussing changes in institutional journalism and the forces that helped bring them
about).
4. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM
IN AMERICA 36 (1998).
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notion that everyone is capable of contributing usefully to public discourse and
equally entitled to do so. In law, this view is reflected in, among other things,
the general First Amendment doctrine holding that government cannot regulate
speech in a way that discriminates on the basis of the identity of the speaker or
the content of the speech.5 In our culture, as Michael Kagan has recently
suggested, an emblem for this is Norman Rockwell’s poster Freedom of Speech,
in which “a slightly rumpled man in working class clothing—he literally wears
a blue collar—stands to speak at a crowded public meeting,” while “an older,
gray-haired man in a black suit and tie looks up intently to listen.”6 Whatever
their differences in education, class, or other matters—and we would certainly
today insert other differences, such as race and gender—they are “both alike in
dignity”7 and equally valued for their contribution to democratic discussion.
It is common today to believe that “because we live in a democratic [and
egalitarian] society, the institution[s] we inhabit should embody democratic
[and egalitarian] principles.”8 Common, but wrong. It is certainly wrong about
the academy, which is a non-democratic, non-egalitarian institution. Students
do not (and should not) enjoy equal status with professors. Professors
themselves must prove their expertise and worth in order to be hired, to be
promoted, and to earn prominence in their field.9 A doctorate in astronomy is
only the beginning of the ability to call yourself an academic astronomer; now
more than ever, a doctorate certainly will not lead inevitably to a position in the
academy. And that position is itself limited in scope: academic astronomers do
not get a vote about who gets to become an academic sociologist.10
5. See, e.g., L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 47 n.4 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have repeatedly frowned on regulations that discriminate based
on the content of the speech or the identity of the speaker.”).
6. Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of Free Speech, 42 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 765, 769 (2015).
7. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act I, prologue.
8. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 110 (2008) (describing but not
endorsing this view).
9. Of course, there is such a thing as unearned prominence. In the short run, at least, and probably
the long run too, academics—especially legal academics—often judge by professional credentials
rather than intellectual worth, or at least pay disproportionate attention to the former.
10. The same is true of other institutions. A religious body may be egalitarian by choice,
although even those bodies are rarely democratic: a church that follows the principle of sola scriptura
may believe that each person is obligated to read and limn the Bible for him or herself, but it does not
necessarily believe each reading is equally legitimate, or put the meaning of disputed Bible passages
up for majority vote. And in hierarchical churches, the laity do not have the same right to interpret and
declare doctrine as the leadership, which itself is not necessarily selected by democratic or egalitarian
means. The laity and leadership of such a church can certainly contend over whether to change this
norm, but this is strictly a matter of internal debate. The law has no business dictating that hierarchical
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So, at the broad level, institutions—some institutions, at least, and
especially those, like universities, that fulfill valuable and particular social
functions and operate according to long (if changing) tradition, norms, and
practices—are varied and valuable. Whether they would agree with this
expressly or not, many members of such institutions, and members of the
broader public, would have little trouble with this proposition. More
controversially, perhaps, I believe there is also room for pluralism within
institutions: that is, that there is room for a diversity of values and approaches
within particular institutions such as universities or the press. Not all
newspapers or magazines cover the same subjects in the same way, or have an
identical sense of mission. They may agree on certain fundamental norms or
practices, such as not plagiarizing, or ensuring that sources are quoted
accurately. Beyond such general commonplace norms, however, they vary
greatly. By saying there is room for such intra-institutional pluralism, however,
I am going a step beyond simply recognizing the fact of such differences. I
believe this intra-institutional pluralism is a good thing.11
Within the legal academy, the usual focus of arguments on this subject is
the role of religiously affiliated law schools.12 That focus artificially limits and
distorts the discussion. Other law schools focus on other specific missions as
well: serving and advancing particular populations such as African-Americans,
emphasizing particular fields (such as environmental law) or methodologies
(such as law and economics), concentrating on training lawyers for a particular
region (the many state schools—although this is truer in theory than in
practice), or emphasizing particular goals and ideologies such as “social
justice.”13 These different projects, focuses, and functions suggest different

churches become Congregationalist entities, let alone liberal democratic ones, any more than it has the
right to tell The New York Times to get rid of its executive editor and become “an autonomous
collective” in which various staffers “take . . . turns to . . . act as a sort of executive-officer-for-theweek.” See Monty Python and the Holy Grail (Python Pictures 1974).
11. Cf. Paul Horwitz, Positive Pluralism Now, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1016–17 (2017)
(reviewing JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP
DIFFERENCE (2016)) [hereinafter Horwitz, Positive Pluralism] (arguing generally that pluralism is a
good in itself, not simply a sociological fact); Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal Argument
for Accommodation of Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1302–05 (2016) (writing to similar
effect).
12. See, e.g., AALS Symposium on Institutional Pluralism: The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law
Schools, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125 (2009). The subtitle in this example is hardly incidental.
13. See, e.g., Gwynne Skinner, A Clinical Model for Bringing International Human Rights
Home: Human Rights Reporting on Conditions of Immigrant Detention, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
649, 651 (2009) (describing “the arena of equal justice and social justice advocacy” as “central to the
mission of Seattle University School of Law”).
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ways of approaching the “academic” mission: different practices, norms, and
rules.
It is certainly possible to argue that some of these are simply not proper
“academic” missions, and that whether these institutions are good or bad, to the
extent that they pursue these goals they are not truly academic institutions.
They may be condemned outright, or they may be judged by a different set of
standards: by religious standards, for example, or social justice standards, but
not conventional academic standards. But, on this view, they should not be
treated as genuine academic institutions as such. I confess, albeit with some
ambivalence, that this is not my own preference. Part of the internal debate and
slow change or evolution of institutions at the broad level, such as the press or
universities, involves different practices and views held and practiced by
different individual entities, such as individual newspapers or law schools.
These are serious debates and practices about what it means to do academic
work. I do not think it is enough, or always accurate, to simply call some of
these views “non-academic.” “[C]ultivating differences” may be “a better thing
for legal education” than forcing them into a narrow box.14 With more than 200
law schools in the United States, there is room for that kind of diversity or
pluralism within the legal academy as an institution.
The problem with this sort of institutional pluralism—and not the only one,
although I continue to avow it—is that it makes judgment and prescription on
questions of the ethics of legal scholarship difficult if not impossible. At the
least, it renders such judgments “problematic,” to use the popular lingo of the
day. How is an ethics of legal scholarship possible if one believes the legal
academy can be many things? How can anything be forbidden if everything is
permitted?
I have two answers to this question. Each may dissatisfy in its own way,
although I worry about the first kind of dissatisfaction and rather enjoy the
discomfiture that might result from the second answer.
The first is potentially unstable but not necessarily paradoxical.
Institutional pluralism is neither pure relativism nor indifference to the forms
that institutional practices take. More than one set of institutional practices or
norms may fit under the general umbrella of a particular institution, and some
degree of humility and deference is required when evaluating those potential
paths. One might acknowledge that a newspaper or church or university might
take an approach that one does not favor oneself, but retain a sense of the limits
of one’s own vision and withhold hasty judgment about it. But it doesn’t

14. John Garvey, Introduction, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125, 127 (2009).
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require one to believe that every practice or norm properly belongs under that
umbrella—that everything is permitted.
The limits I am interested in here, however broad or imperfectly
understood, are internal institutional limits.15 One may believe that journalism
is a sufficiently diverse institution to permit both openly partisan news organs
and others that attempt to remain above or outside the political fray and to report
as disinterestedly as possible, while believing that any kind of magazine or
newspaper that deliberately lies or buries inconvenient facts is not engaged in
“journalism,” but a different practice altogether, such as propaganda. One can
recognize that institutions change over time and that their practices are subject
to contestation, and acknowledge the difficulties of fixing the point at which a
practice or norm is unacceptable, while doing one’s best to derive from those
institutions’ practices, norms, traditions, history, and development, some basis
for, and sense of, the outer boundaries.
To that extent, one can believe in pluralism within institutions while still
believing that some practices fall outside even capacious boundaries, and that
there is some common ground for all members of that institution. An
institutional ethics can be built on that ground. I suspect it is built on that
ground all the time. Legal academics take a variety of approaches to
scholarship, but not an endless variety, and nearly all of them agree that some
practices are unethical. And many or most legal academics, whether they
would put the point in ethical terms or not, show a fair amount of dissatisfaction
with many current practices—including some that they engage in themselves.
Hence, this Symposium itself. The number of legal academics who express a
sense that something has gone wrong with the enterprise and that various
practices—puffery, exaggerated claims of “novelty,” failure to give due
attention to counter-arguments, abuse of history or precedent, and others—is
substantial. And it includes within its ranks legal academics who hold widely
15. Although they are not my focus, there are also potential external limits to institutional
pluralism. These are Holmes’s “can’t helps”—our “deepest values . . . [that] live below thought and
provide warrants for action even when we cannot give those values a compelling or perhaps any
rational justification.” Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom
Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 447 (1992) (quoting
Letter of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in MARK DEWOLFE HOWE,
2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1124 (2d ed. 1953)). One might insist, for example, that child sacrifice is
an unacceptable practice for religious institutions. One must be wary, however, of equating such moral
“can’t helps” with normative conclusions about the nature and practices of institutions as such. One
can believe that a church cannot be allowed to practice child sacrifice without drawing any conclusions
about whether such a church is still properly described as a church. A law school that practiced child
sacrifice, however, would be departing from both our external, moral commitments and any reasonable
understanding of the current or historical institutional practices of the legal academy (at least so far as
I am aware).
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varied—in other words, plural—positions about the purpose and functions of
the legal academy: those who favor normative work and those who deplore it,
those who see legal scholarship as a form of legal and political advocacy and
those who strongly disagree with that view, and many others.
Moreover—and this is my second, perhaps more discomfiting answer to the
question whether it is possible to believe in an ethics of legal scholarship despite
being an institutional pluralist—belief in intra-institutional pluralism does not
preclude taking one’s own stand on preferable institutional norms, practices,
and traditions. It does not prevent one from taking normative positions on the
ethics of legal scholarship, in short. This too may be a difficult position to
occupy stably and confidently, but it’s hardly impossible. My belief that there
is more than one way for a law school or a legal scholar to function does not
stop me from holding my own professional beliefs about better or worse, and
more or less ethical, ways to function as a legal scholar.
Put more strongly, despite my general belief in institutional pluralism, I
remain compelled to argue for particular norms, practices, and approaches and
against others. I think there are indeed proper professional and ethical practices
for legal academics, both in the classroom and in teaching and service. Every
day I read law review articles and abstracts—or read the abstracts and throw
away the articles themselves, more in anger than in sorrow—that seem very
different indeed from my sense of what those practices and norms should be. I
react similarly to many of the extra-academic writings by law professors that I
encounter: the op-eds and pieces in Slate or The Atlantic, the twits16 and other
social-media writings. These writings routinely trade on the ostensible
expertise, authority, and title of the writer while far exceeding the author’s
actual expertise. They display little of the care, nuance, and awareness of
counter-arguments that characterize academically responsible work, even to the
extent that the different length and format of these writings might easily permit.
I see intelligent and talented people with legal academic positions doing what I
think they should not do, and what I think they think (or know) they should not
do either. I have views and take public stands on these matters.
Despite other areas of disagreement, my own view is similar to that of
another contributor to this Symposium, Stanley Fish. Academics—including
legal academics—should do their own jobs. That job is to do the work of an
academic: not a social engineer, a party apparatchik, a paid or unpaid “amicus”
to some petitioner or respondent, or an enlisted soldier in the culture wars.
(Doing one’s academic work properly and with scholarly integrity is a form of
16. I believe the proper word is “tweets,” not “twits,” but I much prefer and insist on my alternate
version, which is more descriptively accurate. I write this despite having and using a Twitter account
myself, for which I am heartily sorry.
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service in the culture wars, however. Among other things, in hewing closely
and truly to one’s narrow professional obligations, one builds institutional
islands in which time and discourse proceed at a different pace and in a different
way: an other-directed way, touched but not subsumed by the clash of ignorant
armies, driven deeply by ostensibly urgent and present-oriented social and
political concerns, that takes place outside those institutions.) The job is not to
seek justice or righteousness, but understanding, clarity, and the advancement
of knowledge. Ours is the job of “academicizing”: “[T]o detach [a topic] from
the context of its real world urgency, where there is a vote to be taken or an
agenda to be embraced, and insert it into a context of academic urgency, where
there is an account to be offered or an analysis to be performed.”17
How does one reconcile this with a sense of pluralism within institutions, a
sense that there is more than one path or set of practices even within a single
institution, like universities or law schools? “Uneasily and unstably,” would be
one short and blunt answer. “Falsely” or “impossibly” would be another, as
blunt but more accusatory. On this view, to not only practice and avow a
particular set of institutional practices, but argue for them and criticize others,
is to take sides in the contest of academic visions. In the end, all that talk of
“institutional pluralism” is just havering or denial. The first answer I think is
unquestionably true, and I cannot deny that the second one may in the end be
true as well.
My own sense of the matter is different. That difference matters at a dayto-day or year-to-year level, although I reserve judgment about whether it
ultimately distinguishes it from simply taking sides. Part of the difference has
to do with humility, or perhaps mere uncertainty, and with a sense of the
possibility of valid alternative paths and practices. Arguments about the
impossibility of setting absolute borders around the “academic,” or about the
permeability of those borders and the inevitability of politics, do not impress
me much. There is surely a difference between acknowledging these
difficulties and viewing them as an excuse, or license, not to act as an ethical
academic professional.18 Nor do arguments about the urgency of the present
moment, which are more or less literally all the rage these days: what used to
17. FISH, supra note 8, at 27.
18. Cf. ALBERT CAMUS, The Absurd Man, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 66,
67 (First Vintage International ed., Vintage International 1991) (1955) (“‘Everything is permitted’ does
not mean that nothing is forbidden.”). We are, in this Article and within our own institution of legal
academia, at least one step removed from the philosophical, ethical, and existential complexities of
such a proposition. Within institutions, including the legal academy, and despite the wide variety of
views about what constitutes the function of a legal academic, we do not think everything is permitted.
At least in practice, even those who believe that it is difficult to define with precision the borders of
what is permitted or forbidden within academic work still believe that some things are forbidden.
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be called the argumentum ad Hitlerum and today might be called the
argumentum ad Trumpum.
But someone who thinks that a single institution, such as the press or the
university, can (at least up to a point) contain under its umbrella more than one
vision, more than one set of practices and norms, will be reluctant to reach a
final and definitive judgment that there is one right way for academics to act.
He may insist on borders and limits, but he will resist the urge to make them
too detailed or confining. Rather than reject those alternative visions and
practices immediately and entirely, he may be interested in learning more about
them, examining how they function, asking whether they have a place in the
university, and wondering what ethics such practices might demand. He may
learn from some of these positions and even accept some of them. He may also,
to be sure, end up rejecting them, in whole or in part.
Moreover, the institutional pluralist’s vision of certain vital institutions is
that they are profoundly important but not unchanging—that they have, in fact,
changed and developed (not “evolved,” at least insofar as that vastly overused
word suggests a Whiggish notion of progress) repeatedly over the centuries.
Awareness of that fact will place him somewhat, although certainly not entirely,
outside the fray. It will lead him to academicize even his notion of the academy
itself. This vision need not lead him to conclude that everything is permitted
and nothing forbidden. Institutional change is always as much a function of a
larger process of history and tradition as it is of contemporary contestation.
Whatever external factors and urgencies—political, cultural, economic, and so
on—affect the process and the debate, the process also draws on decades or
centuries of internal norms, traditions, and arguments.
One may conclude that there are core functions beyond which some
practices simply do not belong within a particular institution, such as the
academy. For that institution, some practices must be counted as unethical,
unprofessional, or simply wrong. But awareness that the institution and its
norms and practices are part of a process of change over time may make the
institutional pluralist leery of being too prescriptive too soon, or too broad in
those prescriptions. Institutionalists, and academics, operate in the present and
participate in its struggles, as they must. But they also operate—or should—on
a different and much longer time scale. The institutional pluralist’s sense of
internal debates over norms and practices will have a touch of “Zhou Enlai
time”19 to it. I firmly believe that certain practices and norms are wrong for the
19. See Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
59, 128 n.390 (2013) (discussing and noting the provenance of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s possibly
apocryphal response to a question posed to him in 1972 about the effects of the French Revolution;
Zhou said it was “too early to say”).
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legal academy: that academicizing is our job, not pressing—in our capacity as
academics, at least—for social or political change in a way that risks putting
scholarship second, or writing with a political or ideological goal in mind. But
I also think it is too early to tell for sure.
The result of this belief in institutional pluralism need not be that one
withdraws altogether from disputes over these questions, any more than
pluralistic views about the relationship between equality and religious liberty
require one to disclaim any position on, say, the equal dignity of LGBTQ
individuals or the moral or legal rightness of same-sex marriage. On my blog
and elsewhere, I have identified and criticized practices by other legal
academics that I believe are worthy of criticism. Nor, certainly, does my belief
in institutional pluralism liberate me to violate my own sense of what
constitutes ethical legal scholarship, on the grounds that I might be wrong in
those views. I continue to try—imperfectly, to be sure—to research and write
in accordance with what I believe is the proper function of legal scholarship
and the responsibilities, obligations, and constraints that go along with it. In
short, notwithstanding my belief that there are different possible practices and
views concerning how to do legal scholarship, I attempt (again, imperfectly) to
follow and advocate for what I think is the right way of doing things.
But my belief in institutional pluralism does affect my sense of the goal of
advocating for a particular vision of sound legal scholarship. In the case of
pluralism’s relationship to debates over LGBTQ equality and religious liberty,
and to culture-war issues more generally, I have written that while it is difficult
to describe why pluralism is a good in itself, as opposed to “a mere ‘claim of
descriptive sociology’ to be managed,”20 there is a difference between treating
some value (like liberty, or equality) as the master value, and thus treating
pluralism as something to be accommodated only after the fact and only insofar
as it is consistent with that master value, and “an approach that starts with
pluralism as a positive feature of our society and treats liberty or equality as
factors to be weighed and considered as means of helping pluralism itself
flourish.”21 Something similar can be said about intra-institutional debates
about what the university (or the press, or some other institution) is for, and
how it should function.
The difference can be felt in the heat and fierceness of our current cultural
and political debates, the assurance with which they are pursued, and the
eagerness of some of the disputants to insist, through the logic of congruence,
20. Hortwitz, Positive Pluralism, supra note 11, at 1017 (citing JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM,
PLURALISM, AND F REEDOM 27 (2015)).
21. Id.
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that their position not only win the public debate but that such victories be
irreversibly entrenched through law, including constitutional law. They insist
on total, permanent victory. Similarly, whatever their actual goals or purposes,
conservative legislators and others who have pushed for an “Academic Bill of
Rights,”22 or laws ensuring political diversity in faculty hiring,23 or other rules
for the university, are not just arguing for a particular vision of academic
ethics—one with which, on a number of points, I am fairly sympathetic. They
also insist that this vision be entrenched, and competing visions extirpated from
the university. I feel compelled both to practice and to argue for what I think
is the proper function of the university and of (legal) academic ethics. Because
I begin from a vision of institutional pluralism, however, and because I think
there is a fair amount of room for the contestation of competing visions of the
university, I feel no compulsion to press urgently for total victory for my own
vision—even if I think it’s the right vision.
I am more than willing to argue firmly for what I think is the right approach
and against other approaches. If the vast majority of my colleagues in the legal
academy adopted a different vision of legal scholarship or other legal academic
rules and practices, or treated certain practices—puffery about the “novelty” of
a law review article, for example—as a good thing or at least as no big deal, I
would continue to argue against them and do my best to deny them a final
victory. But my interest is in preventing their final victory, not ensuring my
own.
This cautious approach is not absolute. Some practices might be so far from
what I think of as the core of the academic institution properly understood that
I would fight without hesitation to cast them, and their practitioners, out of the
academy. In his book on academic freedom, Fish tells the story of Denis
Rancourt, officially a physics professor at the University of Ottawa but really a
political activist, who was ultimately removed from his job and prevented from
teaching because he engaged in “what he call[ed] ‘academic squatting’—
turning a course with an advertised subject matter and syllabus into a workshop

22. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1551–53 (2007).
23. See, e.g., William Petroski & Brianne Pfannenstiel, Political Diversity Among Faculty Won’t
be Required. Here are Some Bills That Died in the 2017 Iowa Legislature, DES MOINES REG. (April
25, 2017), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/22/political-diversityamong-faculty-wont-required-here-some-bills-died-2017-iowa-legislature/99624024/
[https://perma.cc/4JC2-9BB3] (discussing a failed bill instituting a hiring freeze at Iowa’s public
universities until rough parity was achieved between registered Republicans and registered Democrats
on those universities’ faculties).

HORWITZ 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

936

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/10/18 10:07 AM

[101:925

for revolutionary activity.”24 Rancourt’s dismissal was the right thing. For the
most part, however, I would allow competing visions and practices to continue,
including many that I think are not consistent with the correct vision of
academic functioning, while arguing against them. If this is not broad or firm
ground on which to stand, so be it.
Again, this approach raises serious questions about, and difficulties in,
making recommendations for a sound ethics of legal scholarship, including the
suggested principles that my fellow Symposium participants and I have
published here.25 Someone with the pluralist views I have described has a
number of options. She could decline to issue any recommendations, although
I have argued that this is not required by my stance. She could focus only on
what she thinks are the core principles of ethical scholarly practice, leaving
anything outside that small core for ongoing debate. She could, conversely,
issue prescriptions so broad as to be virtually meaningless, like a doctor
recommending that a headache be treated by aspirin, acetaminophen, morphine,
acupuncture, Chinese herbs, psychiatry, biofeedback, or meditation.26 Such a
recommendation may be valid27 but is not terribly helpful. Finally, she might
confidently issue specific recommendations based on her own view of what
constitutes sound ethics in legal scholarship, while adding the caveat that other
prescriptions, even radically different ones, are not necessarily beyond the pale.
This last approach is not so much a prescription or description as it is an
argument, one that takes the implicit position that although it would be good on
the whole if people complied with it, they need not do so.
My approach here is closest to the second approach listed above. I focus
on two core values that arguably are essential to sound functioning for any
academic. These values are not only basic but fairly banal. But their
implications, if taken seriously—a big “if,” to be sure—are not.
The two core values are candor and integrity. By candor, I mean not just
honesty and sincerity, but a willingness to exhibit the honesty and sincerity
required to make a statement and its motives sufficiently transparent to be fully
24. STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: F ROM PROFESSIONALISM TO
REVOLUTION 14 (2014).
25. See Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 897 (2018).
26. See Headaches: Treatment Depends on your Diagnosis and Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/chronic-daily-headaches/in-depth/headaches/art20047375 [https://perma.cc/Y6DB-X93E] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (mentioning almost all of these
treatments).
27. I have my doubts about some of these treatments, and in keeping with some of my general
complaints about the nature of professional ethics today, it is not clear that all of them are based on
meaningful medical expertise.
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understood by the recipient of the communication.28 It thus involves, as Micah
Schwartzman has written, elements of both “sincerity and disclosure.”29 By
integrity, I mean especially coherence between belief, word, and deed. I follow
roughly Stephen L. Carter’s definition of integrity, which has been summarized
as requiring “(1) carefully reflecting on right and wrong in a particular context
(a process he calls ‘discernment’); (2) acting on the outcome of this reflection;
and (3) avowing the coherence between one’s reflection and conduct.”30
In the context of the ethics of legal scholarship, what candor and integrity,
taken together, demand are that the legal scholar: (1) reflect on her approach to
legal scholarship, generally and/or in a particular case; (2) reflect on the
implications of that approach; (3) reflect on her motives in engaging in a
particular legal scholarly activity (an activity I define in certain circumstances,
described below, to include things other than scholarly articles or books); (4)
act consistently with those reflections; and (5) do so with enough transparency
and openness that the reader can judge for himself the purpose of the argument
being made and its authority or reliability.
Candor and integrity, thus defined, are consistent with the fairly
traditionalist, “deflationary,”31 “do your job” approach to legal scholarship.
That argument is pursued elsewhere in the contributions to this Symposium.32
I want to focus here on what these core values might mean for approaches to
legal scholarship that depart, in whole or in part, from that conventional model.
These include approaches to legal scholarship that view our task as that of
rendering expert advice to judges and other lawmakers, with the goal of
advancing the “right solution of . . . social problems.”33 They also include those
academics who may confuse their job or function with their personal virtues,
28. See Candor, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 828 (2d ed. 1989). Much of this is inherent in
the fifth definition of “candor” in the Oxford English Dictionary: “Freedom from reserve in one’s
statements; openness, frankness, ingenuousness, outspokenness.” Id. For my purposes, freedom from
reserve, openness, and ingenuousness are the key concepts.
29. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 994 (2008).
30. Martin Benjamin, Book Review, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 180, 180 (1997)
(reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY (1996)).
31. FISH, supra note 24, at 20.
32. See, e.g., Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The Truth of the Matter: Why the Social Contract Dictates
Legal Scholars’ Sincerity, Candor & Thoroughness, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1063 (2018); Neil Hamilton,
Legal Scholars’ Ethical Responsibilities Concerning Neutrality and Objectivity, Candor and
Exhaustiveness, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1045 (2018).
33. FISH, supra note 25, at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting AAUP, 1915 DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915)); accord ROBERT C. POST,
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR
THE MODERN STATE (2012).
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extolling themselves as fearless truth-tellers and superb critical thinkers
possessed of a unique wisdom that tempts, if not entitles, them to pronounce on
a wide range of issues, not as citizens but as academics, always with their
academic titles displayed prominently.34
Not least, these approaches include the view of those legal scholars who
assert that “[t]he legal scholar’s rightful aim is not simply to speak the
truth . . . . It is to speak the truth to power.”35 The ideal legal academy, in this
view, is “an ethical community of scholars and activists committed to
combating injustice.”36 On this view, the job of the legal scholar is not to
academicize politically controversial questions, but to use academic work to
wage politics, identifying and attacking injustice and securing vital legal and
political victories. The injustice may involve racial or other forms of inequality,
the subordination of the disenfranchised and powerless, the growth of big
government, the spread of legal abortion or threats to reproductive rights, and
so on. The cause served may be libertarianism, values conservatism,
progressivism, leftism, or what have you. In the legal academy the cause is
more likely to lean left than right, and more likely to lean toward a fairly
bourgeois version of progressivism than a radical political revolutionary
program; but it certainly can and does include conservatives or libertarians of
various stripes. Whatever the cause, the goal is its achievement, not just its
academic study.
For various reasons, in the legal academy this often means that the legal
academic becomes a scholar-activist, a scholar-advocate, or a “public” legal
academic, one whose arguments are advanced not only through conventional
legal scholarship, but through op-eds, amicus briefs, scholars’ letters, twits37
and blog posts and other uses of social media, and other tools in the apparatus
of public political discourse and advocacy. Importantly, these activities are
undertaken as a legal academic and under the auspices of one’s legal academic
title and ostensible authority. Using—I would say trading on—one’s title and
ostensible authority or expertise as a legal academic is an essential part of this

34. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 24, at 11–12, 50–51, 95–96. There is some relationship between
this conception and Fish’s description of “academic exceptionalism.” Id. at 74. It is also connected to
Fish’s description of the “[a]cademic freedom as critique” school, which he describes thus: “If
academics have the special capacity to see through the conventional public wisdom and expose its
contradictions, exercising that capacity is, when it comes down to it, the academic’s real job; critique—
of everything—is the continuing obligation.” Id. at 12.
35. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2347 (1999).
36. Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Expanding Directions, Exploding Parameters:
Culture and Nation in LatCrit Coalitional Imagination, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 787, 788 (2000).
37. Again, one may read that word as “tweets” here.
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form of activity. A blog consisting of posts critical of the Trump administration
that is authored by various American citizens or residents, many of whom
happen to hold law degrees or positions in the legal academy, is one thing. It
may get some attention and might convince some readers by virtue of the
strength of its arguments, but does not seek to bludgeon its readers with
(sometimes questionable) authority. A blog with the same posts that trumpets
that its “contributors include many preeminent legal authorities, as well as
rising stars within the profession,” all of whom “stand united in their desire to
protect and defend the rule of law in America,” is quite another.38
How would the twin values of candor and integrity affect these common
alternate approaches to legal scholarship? As I have suggested, I do not favor
these alternate approaches, but neither am I willing to argue strongly for their
elimination, or for their being cast out from the general category of “academic”
work or “scholarship.” But it is possible to imagine what a scholar following
one of these paths would write, and how he would act, if he were committed to
acting with candor and integrity. The result, I think, would be a commendable
gain in the ability of readers to judge this sort of scholarship better, and an
equally commendable deflation of the ostensible academic “authority” of this
approach to scholarship or public advocacy.
Imagine, for instance, a law review article written by a legal scholar who
believes that her job requires her to use her expertise for the purpose of social
betterment, to advance the cause of finding the “right solution of social
problems”—to serve, in short, as a kind of roving, one-woman law reform
commission, recommending fixes to statutes, changes in existing law and
policy, or better judicial doctrine in a particular area. This is, of course, a very
common approach to legal scholarship—perhaps the dominant mode.39 The
law review article in this common mode always culminates in what Pierre
38. Announcing
Take
Care,
TAKE
CARE
BLOG
(Mar.
16,
2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/announcing-take-care [https://perma.cc/22DU-LZGT]; see also Orin
Kerr, New Legal Blog, Take Care, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/16/new-legal-blog-takecare/?utm_term=.554f68e4673d [http://perma.cc/537J-H296] (“The list of bloggers is long and
impressive, consisting mostly of prominent liberal constitutional law professors.”). It is worth noting
that although the early announcements from and about the blog, and the early versions of its “About
Us” page, were vigorous in promoting the impressive credentials of its contributors, in terms not too
different from a marriage between the US News & World Report law school rankings and US magazine,
the current version of the “About Us” page has eliminated the gross credentialism that used to appear
there. See About Us, TAKE CARE BLOG, https://takecareblog.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/VZJ2CMGH] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
39. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 808
(1991) [hereinafter Schlag, Normativity].
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Schlag calls “the law review equivalent of the prayer for relief—namely, the
normative prescription, the ‘And therefore the court should or the legislature
should or we should or the zeitgeist should’” section.40 This is the approach
that always figured in the advice of my late friend Dan Markel, who was among
other things a canny thinker about the mechanics of legal scholarship and
placement and who, for both sincere and strategic reasons, frequently reacted
to friends’ article drafts by asking, “What’s the normative payoff?”
This is not a necessary format. There is nothing wrong with a legal
academic asking questions she cannot answer, or describing a problem without
offering any solutions. But it is a common format. That is understandable,
given that lawyers are trained to be problem-solvers. It may also have
something to do with how law professors are produced. Harvard Law School,
for instance, still generates a large number of future law professors, many of
whom serve on the Harvard Law Review. There, they are trained to write case
comments that, with awful regularity, follow the same format: (1)
Courts/legislatures/officials/society are dealing with problem X; (2) In Jones v.
Smith, the federal appellate court (or, occasionally, a state court, legislature, or
administrative agency) held that Y; (3) Although the actor [insert mild flattery
here], its opinion [insert criticism here]; (4) If the court had instead held Z, we
would have been much better off. Having absorbed this format and repeated it
mutatis mutandis as a federal law clerk, and given the conservatism, cynicism,
or path-dependence of the legal academic profession and of the prospective
academic’s mentors in the job-seeking process, the budding scholar will rinse
and repeat, perhaps not indefinitely (several legal scholars have told me they
abandon this approach at least once they have won tenure), but certainly ad
nauseam.
To repeat, this is not the only available approach.41 But it is probably the
most common, and it is repeated and perpetuated, in slightly more sophisticated
versions, through at least the job-hunting and tenure-seeking stages of the
40. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing (A Report on
the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 813 (2009) [hereinafter Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence]; see also
Shari Motro, Scholarship Against Desire, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115, 116 (2015) (suggesting that
law professors are taken more seriously if they follow a scholarly model that “ask[s] questions [they
can] solve rather than ones that merely invite[ ] a conversation”).
41. Yale Law School, for example, is another common breeding ground for law professors. Its
major credentializing organization, the Yale Law Journal, does not invariably follow this format for its
student pieces, which are more often notes than case comments. (The Harvard Law Review also
publishes notes, and not all its notes follow the mechanical approach of its case comments. But many
do.) Although many of its student notes culminate in the standard prayer for relief, they do not
invariably do so, and they certainly do not follow a recognizable, mechanical, standard format. Some
might suggest that they do not follow a recognizable anything.
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typical legal academic career. The problems may get bigger, and the tools and
methods brought to bear on studying and solving them more varied and less
doctrinal, but they still usually culminate in a “prayer for relief.”
Because this approach is so common, the applicable ethical norms are fairly
standard and well known, and need not be rehearsed much here. At its best, or
even at the average level, scholarship of this sort meets most of the
requirements of candor and integrity. The scholar is expected to write in her
area of expertise. The problem discussed is expected to be addressed fully and
fairly. The costs and benefits of the proposed solution are supposed to be
canvassed, and an argument made for why the fix is worthwhile.42 Existing and
potential criticisms and counter-arguments are supposed to be examined. All
this is standard fare.
Given that all this is quite well-known, I am not suggesting that this rather
mechanical, reformist format of legal scholarship displays a general failure or
absence of candor and integrity, or that a renewed emphasis on those values
would require radical change. But there are certainly always cases in which
such articles fall short by the measure of candor and integrity, and would look
different if they lived up to it better.
One of the most obvious ways in which such articles could be improved is
by clearly stating their animating premises. If Z is a better solution than Y, it
must be because it does a better job of satisfying some set of desiderata:
equality, liberty, efficiency, autonomy—even, at an absurdly general level,
“justice.” Even if some criteria are given, they are often given at a lower level
of generality than that: Z is better than Y because it provides greater access to
abortion rights, or fewer class certifications, or something else. To say the least,
it would help evaluate such scholarship if the author is explicit about his or her
criteria or animating values, and either attempts to justify them or at least states
them bluntly and makes clear that he will make no effort to justify them. In the
latter case, especially, it would help ensure that readers who reject those
premises or values are not taken in and/or do not waste more time than is
necessary reading the article.
Another way in which such articles could display greater candor and
integrity would be to be clearer about what we might call the author’s endgame.
It is fairly common for prescriptive articles of this sort—the Court should rule
this way in a forthcoming case; the policy actor should take that approach to a

42. It is probably true, however, that much legal scholarship does not address sufficiently the
transition costs involved in legal change. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal
Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002) (discussing the costs of transitioning from one legal norm or
rule to a new one and urging that those costs be taken into account when considering whether a change,
even one that seems substantively preferable, is worthwhile).
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problem—to be deliberately modest and narrow in their scope. Sometimes—
often, one hopes—this is a result of sound scholarship. If you are limited in
your expertise or powers of prediction, or focused narrowly on a particular
problem, it makes sense to confine your work to the problem at hand.
Sometimes, however, it seems clear that this is a strategic choice. The
author has a much more sweeping end in mind, and knows it, and knows that
the proposal offered is meant to push legal actors in the direction of that
change—perhaps even to attempt to make that final step inevitable and
unavoidable. If your goal is, say, to reduce the legal effect of the Establishment
Clause to a bare minimum and allow government to come as close to theocracy
as possible, you are probably better off not saying so off the bat. These kinds
of statements tend to put readers on their guard. Better to dismantle the wall
one brick at a time, disclaiming any wider implications in each case, until you
have reached a logical tipping point.
Again, there is more than one reason to employ a common caveat like, “This
article is not intended to address the following question,” or “I bracket the
important question of X.” It can be offered in good faith, out of modesty or
care. But it can also be a deliberate attempt to conceal: to hide one’s hand, to
avoid frightening the reader or inducing her to ask broader skeptical questions,
to lead her down the garden path while doing your best to obscure the intended
final destination. That may be a sound strategic choice in litigation. But
scholarship is not litigation, and such an approach lacks genuine candor or
integrity. The scholar who takes this approach knows that debate, criticism,
and resistance to her proposals would increase if she made clear where she
intends the line of argument to go. Her goal is precisely to avoid that kind of
criticism, skepticism, and strong resistance. It is to seduce by degrees. I am
not objecting to scholars having such an endpoint in mind. But they should say
so, and accept the consequences of saying so.
Another common—and increasing—failure of candor and integrity in this
format of scholarship, in my opinion, is as closely related to professional
ambition as it is to any sort of political goals. That is the failure or
unwillingness to tease out, or even acknowledge, the varied implications of a
proposed solution. I have seen this approach more often in recent years in job
talks, including talks presenting highly polished and already “well-placed”
papers. It is evident both in the text of the article and in the answers to questions
during the job talk. Job candidates, it would appear, want simultaneously to be
able to boast of the substantial implications of their thesis or normative
conclusion and to deny them as necessary. This desire is related to the jobseeker’s professional goals and concerns. He wants to please politically
sympathetic allies on the faculty without causing any worry about potential
politically “negative” consequences made possible by the argument, and to
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avoid causing offense to potential political opponents on the faculty by boasting
too openly of the sweeping nature of the changes his argument might require.
A writer may, for instance, argue that courts should employ strict scrutiny
in reviewing a new category of claims. She may argue early in the article—
especially in the abstract and introduction, the material most likely to be read
by law review editors and busy hiring faculty alike—that such an approach will
have “sweeping implications” for the area. Or she may ground her proposal for
strict scrutiny on a broad set of arguments suggesting that judges should use
strict scrutiny much more widely in constitutional review, again flagging early
on the “important and novel implications” of such an argument. When asked
sympathetically about the implications of such an approach for a neighboring
area in which the presenter knows the questioner would love strict scrutiny to
be adopted, the author will muse enthusiastically about the possibilities for its
application there. When asked a similar question about an area—say,
admissions policies at public universities—that the author knows is politically
sensitive, or where a substantial number of the faculty would object to strict
scrutiny, or where her implicit suggestion of a sympathetic political orientation
will be muddied, she will answer that she hasn’t thought closely about that
question yet, or that it is outside the scope of her article, and will pivot as
quickly as possible to some other, less controversial issue or question.
Of course, in one sense this is simply bad scholarship. It may be honest bad
scholarship; maybe the scholar really hasn’t thought enough about the
implications of her arguments. If hiring faculties and law review editors were
angels, this bad scholarship would be judged as such. Of course, they are not.
Regardless of the reaction, though, the approach itself, at least when it is
deliberate and strategic, is wrong in itself. Normative scholarship that exhibits
candor and integrity, and that wants to argue that its recommendations are
valuable because of their sweeping implications, will not hesitate to enumerate
all of those implications, including the ones that will run directly contrary to
her own priors or the perceived priors of her audience. If the author doesn’t
like those implications, or knows they are bound to offend more readers than
she would like, she can either find and present sound reasons why the logic of
her position does not extend to those implications, or write a different—and
probably less “sweeping” or “revolutionary,” and thus for some readers less
impressive—paper.
One can imagine similar implications of candor and integrity for the scholar
who imagines that his job is to “speak truth to power,” or engage in that trendy
academic phrase, “critical thinking,” or both. In my view, speaking truth to
power is a political goal, not an academic one. Speaking truth is an academic
goal. Peter Finley Dunne famously wrote that “the job of the newspaper is to
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comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable.”43 Some legal scholars insist
that this is their job too,44 but I think they are wrong.45 The scholar’s job is
neither to comfort nor afflict, nor to be concerned overmuch with the identity
of those who happen to be comforted or afflicted by some piece of scholarship.
Comforting the afflicted is among the worthiest and highest activities one can
undertake in life. But it is a different undertaking—as different from
scholarship (including legal scholarship) as bandaging a wound at a
neighborhood medical clinic is from doing pure research into the incidence of
infections from wounds. There is something to be said for afflicting the
comfortable too. I rather hope some of my scholarship achieves that result, and
I confess that I’m pleased when the comfortable parties who are afflicted by my
work are my fellow academics. But that should be incidental.
Again, that is my understanding of scholarship: its goals, its norms, its
proper practices and ethics. I am happy to argue against those who see their
work as “speaking truth to power”—largely because I think it misunderstands
the purposes of academic work, but not least because the phrase is so rarely
used with real accuracy or honesty. But I am not seeking to oust from the
academic profession those who think otherwise. What I would recommend is
that if they are intent on pursuing this goal, they do so candidly and with
integrity. One can state one’s goal clearly and explain how it applies to and
affects a particular piece of scholarship. One can admit up front that one is
ignoring counter-arguments or logical implications of one’s work because they
might discomfit the “afflicted”—or, perhaps more accurately, because a
complete treatment of that argument might discomfit other (comfortable)
academics who believe one should never discomfit the afflicted. One can, in
short, be explicit about what one is doing as a scholar and why, and how that
affects the arguments and observations that are being made—and those that are
being ignored or omitted. If the work is being undertaken on behalf of or
subsidized by a particular interest group, one can say so. One can ask oneself
what it means to do such work with integrity, and act accordingly.
The primary effect of carrying out work of this kind with candor and
integrity is that it gives the reader a yardstick with which to judge its usefulness
43. For the proper quote, see David Shedden, Today in Media History: Mr. Dooley: ‘The Job of
the Newspaper is to Comfort the Afflicted and Afflict the Comfortable’, POYNTER (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.poynter.org/news/today-media-history-mr-dooley-job-newspaper-comfort-afflicted-andafflict-comfortable [https://perma.cc/D323-4Z8S]. I have paraphrased it to omit the homespun dialect
of Dunne’s fictional character, Mr. Dooley.
44. See, e.g., Glenn Omatsu, Teaching for Social Change: Learning How to Afflict the
Comfortable and Comfort the Afflicted, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 791–92 (1999).
45. I think it is wrong for journalism as well, for that matter, and I did practice briefly in that
field, for what it’s worth.
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and reliability. If you believe your mission as a scholar requires you to speak
truth only “to power,” and to ignore important “truths” that might discomfit the
powerless or afflicted—if, in short, you believe that your truth-seeking mission
as an academic is limited and constrained not by expertise but by political
imperatives—you should say so. The reader then knows that she is not getting
the full story. She may, indeed, become interested in what you have identified
as omissions from that story. She may then explore those omissions in her own
work. If your work recommends a particular law reform, and is aimed at
legislators and their staffers, they will know that they are getting a one-sided
treatment of the issue. They too may want to explore the potential implications
that you have said explicitly exist but won’t be discussed. At least if she is to
be a scholar of integrity, the legal scholar who wants to “comfort the afflicted”
must be willing, by being clear about her intentions and how they constrain her
work, to undermine her own goal. She may even be required, by pointing
candidly to the issues she will not talk about and thus piquing the interest of her
political opposites, to offer hostages to fortune.
All of the categories of legal academic I have discussed so far are common.
But more common still is the scholar-advocate or “public” (the current trendy
phrase is “engaged”) legal academic.46 For our purposes, this passage does a
fair job of summarizing this approach to legal scholarship:
[I]t is the purpose of the scholarship that is key to engagement.
‘[L]egal scholarship, in whatever form,’ must have as ‘its
object influencing the direction of the law—ideally by moving
judges, lawyers, legislators, and bureaucrats to rethink or
reconsider a particular problem.’ The goal of engaged
scholarship is to influence or shape the law itself, rather than
comment on its status.47
The law reviews overflow with this kind of legal scholarship. Elsewhere in
this Symposium, one can find references to recent debates over whether and
when legal scholars should write or sign amicus briefs.48 But virtually every
46. For a discussion of various definitions and forms of “engaged” legal scholarship and useful
citations, see Sonia K. Katyal, Encouraging Engaged Scholarship: Perspectives From an Associate
Dean for Research, 31 TOURO L. REV. 53, 57–58 (2014).
47. David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One:
Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 761, 765 (2005) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Legal
Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 TEX. L. REV. 321, 327
(1999)).
48. Transcript—Conference on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1083
(2018); see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 223, 233 & n.21 (2012) (raising doubts about the practice of filing scholars’
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legal academic knows, and quite a few are happy to say, that scholars’ amicus
briefs are only one part of a larger practice that begins not with arguably
extracurricular activity, but with scholarship itself. A recent article in the
Journal of Legal Education by an openly “engaged” legal scholar counsels: “Do
something that matters. Then write about it. Write an amicus brief; turn it into
a law review article. Draft legislation; turn it into a law review article.”49
Much of the time, for many current legal scholars, the order is reversed: Write
a law review article; then turn it into an amicus brief.
Even that is an incomplete description. These scholars go a step further:
Their law review articles are amicus briefs. 50 They are written with the goal of
convincing judges or other decision-makers to reach a particular decision in a
specific case or on a specific topic of current legal and political debate. Often,
the goal is not so much to reach the judge directly as to reach his or her law
clerks: to provide the arguments or rationales (or rationalizations) the clerk
might use in drafting the opinion for the judge, and to drape them in the cloak
of “authority” by giving the clerk something to cite. Or the goal is a larger
strategic one of using scholarship, along with writing and action on other fronts,
to move an argument from “off the wall” to “on the wall,”51 to give it sufficient
momentum and plausibility that the argument becomes “in play” in public and
legal discussion. A key part of such strategies is using or trading on scholarly
authority: “[T]rying, through [one’s] own gravitas as a noted constitutional
scholar, to convince people that [a relatively novel] argument is not
frivolous.”52
This is not new, to be sure. Pierre Schlag has observed for years that this
is the standard format of normative legal scholarship.53 I do not know if it is
even increasingly common. But it is increasingly noteworthy, for two reasons.
amicus briefs); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Scholars’ Briefs: A Response to Richard Fallon, 16
GREEN BAG 2d 135 (2013) (defending the practice). For a brief but thoughtful discussion of these
issues, see Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal
Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1264–64 (2015).
49. Nancy D. Polikoff, How Does a Radical Lesbian Feminist Who Just Knows How to Holler
Somehow Become a Noted Legal Scholar?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 493, 496 (2017).
50. See, e.g., A Dialogue With Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2012) (comments of Judge Frank Easterbrook) (“I’m not as enthusiastic
about law review articles as Judge Sutton because many law review articles are just amicus briefs
published under another name . . . .”).
51. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38
TULSA L. REV. 553, 567–68 (2003).
52. Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 325, 331 (2013)
(discussing the use of “constitutional persuasion on related fronts: legal and populist”).
53. See, e.g., Schlag, Normativity, supra note 39, at 808; Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, supra
note 40, at 813.
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The first can be described in terms of the sociology of the legal academy.
Normatively oriented law review articles were the standard form of legal
scholarship for decades. Eventually, this model came under pressure as a result
of the entry into the field of larger numbers of legal scholars who were not pure
doctrinalists with years of legal practice behind them, but were using various
tools from other disciplines (in which they often had doctorates) and at least
aspiring to a more “scholarly” model of legal academic work. That many
scholars have returned, more or less openly or covertly, to a model that is not
only normative but fairly openly political or partisan is all the more striking in
light of these changes in the population of the legal academy.
The other reason the “disguised amicus brief” model of legal scholarship is
so noteworthy today is that it has expanded and metastasized, taking advantage
of a variety of social and other media. One need not choose between a law
review article and an amicus brief, or limit oneself to just those two forms of
legal writing. In fact, doing so is poor strategy. The scholar-advocate or public
legal scholar today wages a simultaneous multi-front war. A piece of advocacy
or argument will appear in a law review article. The scholar will attempt to
advance, normalize, or give momentum to that argument by packaging it online
as an op-ed in a major newspaper like The New York Times, or a piece in Slate
or The Atlantic or some other watering-hole for the professional-managerial
class. He will propagate that piece through Twitter and repackage it as a series
of blog posts. He will work with advocacy groups to give it still wider exposure
and do their collective best to make it a talking point in public and political
debate.54 He may organize panels and conferences to give further exposure to
54. Traditionally, those advocacy groups were extramural: Groups like the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund or Alliance for Justice were more or less independent groups that resided outside the
university walls. Today, many ostensibly academic “centers” within law schools are either explicitly
political in their missions or purport to study a particular subject, such as reproductive rights, but seem
only to hire fellows and scholars and advance projects that take a specific position on those issues.
They are often funded by individuals or groups whose other arms or funding activities are open in
pursuing particular goals and outcomes. These centers, and the effects of this sort of funding, have
received much less attention than criticisms of corporate-funded legal research. When these broader
funding projects are criticized, it is generally politically conservative rather than politically liberal or
progressive projects that receive most of the attention and criticism. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The
Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70, 76 (2006) (discussing Exxon’s funding of
scholarly studies on punitive damages); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in
Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1891–
95 (2008) (describing a “shrill and relentless campaign” against corporate liability, punitive damages,
and class actions by “libertarians, economic conservatives, business interests, and the Republican
party,” in which “[f]unding gushed from corporations, business associations, wealthy individual
donors, and right-wing foundations to support literally dozens of think tanks, litigation centers, and
university programs while underwriting a proliferating range of publications, conferences, and
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the argument and transform it into a real or seeming movement. And he will
certainly also attempt to advance the argument through amicus briefs—either
“scholars’ briefs” or briefs written on behalf of some willing group—and
“scholars’ letters.”
Like tech company enthusiasts and TED talk gurus, law professors working
in this vein effectively embrace the idea that all this work is essentially the
same, tailored and spread through a variety of “platforms.”55 It is unsurprising
that Erwin Chemerinsky—who can surely be described accurately and fairly as
a highly successful multi-platform scholar-activist—could have written, before
the full onslaught of social media, that
I find it hard to explain why an amicus brief containing lengthy
and original analysis of a legal issue does not count as
scholarship, but that same brief repackaged and published as a
law review article is deemed scholarship. . . . If writing for
judges can count as scholarship, why not an amicus brief
directed at a particular court?56
Nor is it surprising to read Sonia Katyal, arguing more recently on behalf of
“engaged scholarship,” asserting that embracing different approaches to and
platforms for one’s work can “maximize the real life impact that legal
scholarship can have on current issues.”57
I confess that the more of this sort of activity I see—and there is no shortage
of it, especially in an age of political polarization, renewed culture wars, and
“#resistance”—the more disturbed and dispirited I am by it. Even an
institutional pluralist has his can’t-helps, and this sort of multi-platform
advocacy-scholarship pushes all my buttons. Much of my reaction has to do
with the obviousness of what is going on. When combined with a simultaneous
public refusal to say what is going on and an unrepentant and incomplete private
individual fellowships and grants”); Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory
After the Right’s Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1250 (2007) (describing a “right-wing” strategy in
which “wealthy individual and corporate donors have directed funding to legal scholars who deploy
Law and Economics arguments against disability rights and benefits”). Academic study and
discussion, let alone criticism, of coordination and collaboration between liberal or progressive centers
within law schools, advocacy groups outside law schools, and foundations or individuals that fund
both, is virtually non-existent and generally comes from conservatives, and is thus more likely to be
ignored by those progressives who pay more attention to their allies than their adversaries. Apparently,
the behavior itself is uninteresting and unworthy of concern—just the question of which “side” is
engaging in it. It deserves much more study and criticism (or defense) than that.
55. See generally Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s Power to Transform
Law, 105 KY. L. REV. 413 (2016–2017). Steinberg’s article is about legal and political activism
generally, not the use of social media platform by politically active legal academics in particular. Id.
56. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 892 (2009).
57. Katyal, supra note 46, at 60.
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admission that it is going on,58 it both exhibits and evokes a tremendous sense
of cynicism about both politics and scholarship.59 As something of an idealist
about both fields of human activity, and especially scholarship, which for me is
a vocation, I deplore that cynicism and its effects. And this kind of activity
routinely involves actions that, in my view, subtly harm both scholarship and
public advocacy, and thus the health of both scholarly and public discourse.
A recent example illustrates what I mean.60 In a 2017 op-ed in The New
York Times, Professor Martin Redish argued that President Trump could not,
consistent with the constitutional law of due process, properly pardon former
sheriff Joe Arpaio.61 (The president proceeded to do just that almost
immediately after the op-ed was published.) In that op-ed, Redish wrote,
refreshingly, “I admit that this is a novel theory. There’s no Supreme Court
decision, at least that I know of, that deals specifically with the extent to which
the president may employ his pardon power in [a way that arguably violates
due process principles].”62 A day later, on Slate, my friends and First
Amendment colleagues Micah Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe published a
piece titled, “Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional.”63 A key
paragraph in that piece asserted:
58. I say “incomplete” because its practitioners, in conversation, will cheerfully admit to much
of this, while offering various sincere or cynical defenses (or both). But there are some things they
will not admit about it even in private, either to others or, perhaps, to themselves.
59. One example that again increased my capacity for cynicism about legal scholarship, although
perhaps I should not have been so naïve, came in a scholar’s presentation I heard a while back. The
author prefaced his talk by announcing that he had met Justice Anthony Kennedy and thought he was
susceptible to persuasion, and had written the piece to flatter Kennedy, to cozen him into believing that
he already, by virtue of what he had written so far, took a particular position on an issue, and to
convince him to take the next step and write that view into law at the next opportunity. It is considered
bad form, or unclubbable, to describe such incidents. What happens at a faculty workshop generally
stays at a faculty workshop. But I am not terribly worried in this case about the risk of revealing the
identity of this scholar. This description, after all, fits scores of articles aimed at Justice Kennedy, who
is one of the most flattered judges in the history of the United States Supreme Court.
60. See Paul Horwitz, The Small and Vast Difference Between Two Op-Eds, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Aug. 25, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/08/the-small-and-vast-differencebetween-two-op-eds.html [https://perma.cc/A8H3-RRSE].
61. See Martin H. Redish, A Pardon for Arpaio Would Put Trump in Unchartered Territory,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/trump-arpaio-pardonarizona-sheriff.html [http://perma.cc/7YMC-9U4B].
62. Id.
63. Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional,
SLATE
(Aug.
25,
2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/charlottesville_s_monument
s_are_unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/E7W2-ETPK] (discussing Confederate monuments in
Charlottesville). I note the fact of my friendship with both authors, and add that I very much admire
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So far, the lawsuit over Charlottesville’s monuments has
focused on arcane issues of state law. But there are larger
constitutional principles at stake—most importantly, that the
government is prohibited from conveying messages that
denigrate or demean racial or religious minorities. While
private citizens may engage in hate speech under existing law,
the government may not demean racial or religious minorities
without running afoul of the guarantee of equal protection
contained in the 14th Amendment. Unlike limitations on hate
speech, which remain controversial, this rule against racialized
government speech should enjoy widespread support.64
My problem with this assertion has little or nothing to do with whether I
agree or disagree with it as a normative matter. It lies in two confident little
words, paraded before an audience of non-specialists and buttressed at the end
of the piece by that incantatory author’s description, “X is a professor of law.”
The words are “principles” and “rule.” I think it is fair to say, and that many or
most First Amendment specialists would agree, that it is unclear whether there
is such a principle. If there is, it is as or more unclear whether and how that
principle would apply in this or any other concrete case.
Similarly, the word “rule,” at least in the absence of a prefix like
“proposed,” carries with it the implication that there clearly is such a rule, and
that the courts would—or should, if they follow existing law or “principles”
correctly—agree that it exists and applies in this case. The phrase “rule against
racialized government speech”65 is further reinforced by another rhetorical
device of our new-media age: the hyperlink. It sets off the words in bold purple
type against the dull black of the rest of the text. It suggests to the reader, who
may or may not bother to click through to the link, that this is not just an
argument, but a “fact” established by “authority.” That “authority” turns out to
their work and learn from it regularly. I do so as part of the standard, albeit quite sincere, emphasis
that the criticism is not personal and should not be taken as such. I am not sure this kind of disclaimer
should be necessary, however. My criticism is academic and professional and presented with enough
detail and citation for readers to judge its validity for itself. Academics should not hesitate to criticize
each other, albeit in academic fashion and for academic reasons. Friendship in the academy does not
require some code of omertá or polite silence, although at least one editor at a respected university
press once suggested to me that law professors are far less likely than academics in other fields to
criticize each other’s work. Certainly political alliances are irrelevant: whether I agree or disagree with
these writers’ work on this or other occasions (sometimes yes, sometimes no) should be unimportant.
So are questions of prestige, senior or junior status, or the desire not to offend others for fear of blocking
one’s own professional advancement, although I admit to being as ambitious as the average law
professor.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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be an excellent law review article by Tebbe, titled Government
Nonendorsement, that argues for such a rule.66 The article itself acknowledges
a “widespread” “assumption that the government is free to endorse and
denigrate secular ideas,” and says the assumption arises “thanks in part to the
Supreme Court and in part to scholarship on free speech and religious
freedom.”67 It argues that “that belief is mistaken,” but makes clear that this is
a claim, not a certainty.68 Tebbe argues that the rule is supported by and
immanent in current caselaw, but acknowledges that “free speech examples
[supporting his claim, in court decisions,] are hard[] to find.”69 And, like any
responsible scholar, he anticipates and addresses potential questions and
objections, and notes that they include the essential question what limits should
apply to such a rule, although—in a way that is common in modern legal
scholarship, as I have suggested above—he treats “the question of limits” as
“secondary.”70
No reader of this law review article would fail to understand that Tebbe is
advancing an argument here, and that this argument has no privileged status
and does not simply describe uncontroversial current law. Only the most subtle
and careful reader of Tebbe and Schwartzman’s op-ed, on the other hand, would
be able to tell any of this from the op-ed itself.
Writers of op-eds, when pressed on such points, frequently dismiss them
with the defense that they only had a limited number of words to work with and
couldn’t over-complicate the argument for general readers. Of course, if one
can’t convey such caveats in the limited space available, there is always another
option: Don’t publish the op-ed. In any event, the defense doesn’t apply here.
The authors could easily and economically have substituted words like
“argument” or “proposal” for “principle” or “rule.”
Of course, one can dismiss such things as trivialities or accidents, or
question how much they matter. But it is their very commonness, their
cumulative effect, and the strategic combination of such arguments, with their
elisions and simplifications, across a range of media and approaches, that makes
these individual instances significant and disturbing. And the very fact that
they are connected and concerted, and that the advocacy appearing outside the
confines of traditional forums such as law reviews and university press books
almost always prominently announces and trades on the status and “expert”

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013).
Id. at 649–50.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.
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authority of the scholar as a scholar, makes it hard to dismiss such concerns on
the basis that they are really “just” extra-scholarly advocacy or lawyering.
Again, despite my personal distaste for this model of public or “engaged”
scholarly activity, I do not argue here for its elimination or its expulsion from
the category of “scholarship.” Rather, I ask what the principles of candor and
integrity require in such cases. The answers, by this point in my contribution,
are not surprising.
The key requirement is that any legal scholar engaging in such activity
should say so. Having decided to follow this approach, he should be up-front
about it. He can announce early in a law review article that the article is part of
a larger project of legal advocacy that will include litigation, op-eds, twits, and
other publicity. He can say in work aimed at the general public, as Professor
Redish did so admirably, that he is advancing an argument, not making a
confident assertion of the law as it stands and as the courts would describe it.71
He can make clear, in any forum, that he is writing to achieve a particular result,
not to explore a question disinterestedly. He can either avoid strategic
rhetorical choices aimed at enlisting others rather than persuading them through
pure intellectual argument, or openly acknowledge these choices for what they
are. If his work is part of a larger suite of collaborative advocacy or activism,
he can say so. There is nothing wrong with saying, in the acknowledgment or
“asterisk” footnote of a law review article, “This article was delivered with
funding from [or at a conference hosted and whose expenses were paid for by]
the Center for So-and-So, which advocates for [insert issue and outcome here].”
The Center for So-and-So might not like it, but that is the Center’s problem, not
anyone else’s. He can say, when drafting an amicus brief or scholars’ letter,
that the signatories are not all experts on the issue, or that they are experts on,
say, constitutional law in general, but not on the particular question before the
court. When writing an article that deliberately limits its scope, if the reason
for limiting the scope of the discussion is that the unaddressed questions might
hurt the article’s chances of persuading judges or might give ammunition to his
opponents, he can say just that.
As with the other forms of scholarship discussed above, employing candor
and integrity in this fashion will have beneficial effects. The most important
effect is to send accurate signals to readers, enabling them to evaluate the
work—whether in a scholarly forum or elsewhere—with adequate knowledge
of its goals and limits. An amicus brief written by a group of self-described
non-experts will stand or fall on the merits of the arguments (or whatever other
determinants go into the judge’s decision), not on any purported expert
authority. A reader of an op-ed who is told that the argument being made is an
71. Redish, supra note 62.
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argument about what the law ought to be, that it is novel, or that few if any
courts have accepted such arguments so far, may still agree with the argument,
but will not think she is being given incontrovertible facts, or that anyone who
disagrees with the argument must be callously and dishonestly ignoring reality.
The reader will be aware that she is being sold an argument, that this sale is
being pursued across multiple “platforms,” and that the goal of this concerted
effort is to influence both the courts and the reasonably well-educated laity (and
then some, if one includes Twitter), and to use a wide toolkit of rhetorical and
other devices to “maximize the real life impact [of such interventions] on
current issues.”72 The reader has nothing to lose but her credulity and
innocence.
And the writer? It seems to me he has nothing to lose that he is entitled to
complain about losing. A frequent response I have received to objections to
lack of candor and integrity in publicly oriented scholarship, and the use of
scholarly credentials to buttress arguments aimed at the public, is that no
disclosures are required because, in effect, everyone already understands the
game. If that is the case, then the kinds of disclosures I recommend can hardly
undermine the work. The problem is one of mere redundancy—that such
disclosures are unnecessary. Redundancy seems a pretty small price to pay to
ensure the integrity of the scholarly enterprise and guard against taking in more
naïve or vulnerable non-specialist readers.
The other possibility, of course, is that everyone does not already
understand the game. Or the problem may be that it is not always clear when a
piece of scholarship or some other piece of writing is a disinterested analysis of
an issue and when it is part of a larger project of advocacy, and that the scholaradvocate relies on and takes advantage of the boost in authority and
persuasiveness that results from that uncertainty. A scholars’ letter, for
instance, or an amicus brief signed by scholars in a particular field, relies on the
ostensible special expertise that these scholars bring to the question on which
they are opining. And that presumption of expertise comes from more
traditionalist “academicized” work. If the letter-writers lack expertise on the
issue, or are not drawing on that expertise in writing or signing the letter or
brief, or do not in fact agree as experts with all of the content of the brief or
letter, they are trading on that authority for other ends and with no fair basis for
doing so. It is true that if letters or briefs of this sort began with the caveat that
they were not prepared by the signers, or involve assertions on matters on which
the signers are not experts, or do not necessarily agree, they would be taken
much less seriously—if not by judges, who may already not take them

72. Katyal, supra note 46, at 60.
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seriously, then by law clerks, journalists, and the public. That would be a good
thing.
In short, I do not seek to reject all such work as “non-scholarship” or rule it
out of bounds altogether. But it does seem to me that if it were undertaken with
candor and integrity—if its producers told its consumers what they were up to
and why—the political effectiveness of this kind of work would be significantly
undermined. And it is hard for me to see this as anything other than a benefit,
both for scholarship and for democratic dialogue.
There is a final sting in the tail of all this. The exercise of reflection on the
goals of one’s work, and candor about those goals and how they are directing
or limiting one’s work, may lead the scholar to reconsider her vocation. It may,
as the current phrase runs these days, require the “engaged” legal scholar to
“check her own privilege.” And there is no doubt that a tenure-track or tenured
position at an American law school is an enormous privilege. It is not merely
a convenient—even luxurious—place from which to do other kinds of work. It
provides the luxurious gloss of authority. But it does not do so for purposes of
exploiting that authority—even for good ends. To the extent that the engaged
scholar writes, among other things, scholarship that meets all the standard
ethical and professional criteria for scholarship, then the academic perch is
justified. To the extent that her additional, “engaged” work makes explicit its
highly partial goals, its interested perspective, the source of its funding, its
reliance on rhetorical tools of persuasion rather than meaningful expertise, and
so on, at least that work will not trade unfairly on the ostensible authority of the
academic office. But if publicly providing this laundry list of caveats and
disclosures is the price of undertaking “engaged” articles, blog posts, Twitter
feeds, op-eds, amicus briefs, and the like while remaining in the academy, the
“engaged” or public scholar may decide that his or her time would be better
spent leaving the academy and focusing on such work directly. There are many
places to do so: as a public-interest litigator or private lawyer, at a think tank
rather than at a university, as an independent public intellectual rather than a
tenured academic, as a political candidate or office-holder or government
lawyer, and so on. Tenure is not a life sentence, after all. And there are plenty
of would-be scholars who would be happy to fill such positions, and either use
them for only their original intended use, or make it quite clear when they are
doing anything different from that.
There is one more interesting possibility: Scholars who, because of
requirements of candor and integrity, are unable to engage in the same kinds of
public interventions they engage in today, could write exactly the same
things—in their non-academic capacity. No rule says that scholars cannot act
as politically involved and engaged citizens. A professor at an elite law school
who wants to intervene on a public issue, and who is not bringing real expertise
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to the question or not using that expertise properly as an academic, can write an
op-ed that omits any mention of his or her academic affiliation. Law professors
who want to sign amicus briefs on issues on which they have not done the
research or to which they bring no real expertise can similarly sign those briefs
as interested individuals, again omitting any mention of the universities that
employ them. More academics should be politically and civically involved and
engaged. Many more of them should do so without using their titles or
letterheads. If they find that unthinkable, it is possible that it is time for them
to reconsider their vocation.
In fact, none of this is truly unthinkable. To take an imperfect example,
consider Professor Michelle Alexander. A former litigator and professor at the
Stanford and Ohio State law schools,73 Alexander achieved much broader fame
for her book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness.74 In the process of speaking about these issues, Alexander
writes, she became convinced that the kinds of issues she was concerned with,
and the ways she wanted to address them, did not belong in a law school or in
legal academic work.75 “At its core,” she wrote, “America’s journey from
slavery to Jim Crow to mass incarceration raises profound moral and spiritual
questions about who we are, individually and collectively, who we aim to
become, and what we are willing to do now. I have found that these questions
are generally not asked or answered in law schools . . . .”76
So she quit. Or, to be more accurate and less dramatic, she moved. Having
decided to “shift[] [her] own focus from questions of law to questions of
justice,” Alexander decided that a better home for such studies would be a
visiting professorship at Union Theological Seminary.77 That strikes me as
showing an extraordinary sense of candor, integrity, and professional
responsibility to both callings—her new one and her old one. More legal
scholars should emulate her.

73. For Professor Alexander’s professional biography, see Michelle Alexander, UNION
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, https://utsnyc.edu/faculty/michelle-alexander/ [https://perma.cc/CBT37ZF9] (last visited May 2, 2018).
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2016),
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